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Abstract
In a Common Currency Area (CCA) the Common Central Bank sets a uniform rate of in-
flation across countries, taking into account the area’s economic conditions. Suppose that
countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion, a conflict
of interest between members arises when national business cycles are not fully syncronized. If
governments of member countries have an informational advantage over the state of their do-
mestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities
overemphasize their shocks, in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. This
creates an ineﬃciency over and above the one-policy-fits-all cost discussed in the optimal
currency area literature. In order to minimize this extra-burden of asymmetric informa-
tion, monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to small
asymmetric ones. The result is sub-optimal volatility of inflation.
1 Introduction
In a common currency area (CCA) national governments delegate monetary policy decisions
to a supra-national authority, the Common Central Bank (CCB). The CCB sets a uniform
rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area’s economic conditions. Suppose
that countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion1.
Then if national business cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between
members arises. When governments of member countries have an informational advantage
over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection prob-
lem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy
towards their needs. Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the CCB ends up
inappropriately implementing ”stop and go” policies that add to inflation variability. This
cost adds over the standard one-policy-fits-all ineﬃciency related to the loss of an indepen-
dent instrument for stabilization, as discussed in the optimal currency area literature. The
paper’s main result is that the optimal monetary policy must over-react to large (symmetric)
shocks and under-react to small (asymmetric) ones. In order to provide the incentives for
truthful revelation, inflation/deflation is exacerbated in very bad/good states. This policy
(”separating rule”) results in sub-optimal volatility of inflation and welfare loss. Moreover,
we study the case when the CCB decides to ignore some of the information reported by
national authorities. In particular, when the Central Bank conditions her policy only to the
”sign” of the reports (expansion/recession), the resulting policy rule (the ”pooling rule”)
aggravates the problem of inertia: it under-reacts to the area economic conditions, and
inflation variability is even more sub-optimal.
The paper’s central idea is that there is important asymmetric information between pol-
icymakers in diﬀerent countries about their macroeconomic conditions. This can involve
either outright misrepresentation of statistics (for example a country might misreport its
unemployment rate, see below) or misinterpretation of statistics (for example national poli-
1This may be due to the existence of constraints to use domestic policy instruments for stabilization pur-
poses. For example, balanced-budget rules, borrowing ceilings, limited inter-national redistribution schemes
are frequent in currency unions between developed countries. Alternatively, this may be due to borrowing
constraints and limited access to the international capital market, or insuﬃcient national savings, as is often
the case in developing economies.
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cymakers might be better placed than their foreign counterparts for judging the implications
of labor market outcomes on the deviation of output from trend).
In his presidential address to the International Statistical Institute, Felligi (1989)[12]
raises the issue quite clearly:
”..Statistical information is a product with peculiar attributes. One of them is that users are
seldom in a position to check its quality directly. Yet data that are not trusted are clearly of little
utility, whatever their intrinsic quality”
The case of the rate of unemployment in the UK is quite suggestive. In the 80’s British
labor economists have been bewildered by the ever-changing definition of unemployment.
Paul Gregg [14](1994) recalls that
”..Charges ...against the count method of estimating unemployment have concerned allegations
about politically inspired manipulation of the figures through numerous changes in coverage during
the 1980s. The supporting evidence for these changes is that all but one of these changes have been
unidirectional-downwards. Critics have expressed a view that calculating unemployment on the old
(pre-1982) coverage would result in a considerably higher total figure..”2
Lack of confidence in the figures became so serious that a government Working Party was
set up to analyze the question: according to the ensuing oﬃcial report,
”The level of unemployment in a country is a key indicator of economic and social well-being.
The UK figures published monthly are eagerly awaited and hotly debated. Recently, and especially
2According to Bartholomew at al.(1995)[2]
”...in the 1970s, the figure for unemployment broadly related to those receiving unemployment benefits,
plus those who did not receive benefits but registered themselves regularly for possible work. Increasingly
during the early 1980’s the latter group was excluded from the count and the former group was tightened
up. For examples, in 1981, some 195000 individuals were struck oﬀ the count by the removal of those in
training or in temporary work; in 1982, a further 216000 individuals were struck oﬀ when benefit claimants
only were included in the figures; in 1983, some 107000 men who were over 60 years of age, not working and
not entitled to benefits or credits, were similarly struck oﬀ the count. An important consequence of these
and other changes was the unease expressed by the general public about what the published figures actually
meant and how the changes, which occurred both up or down, could be eﬀectively assessed”.
2
during the early part of 1994, debate became intense and it was claimed, on behalf of the Opposition,
that the figures were worthless. It was implied that they were manipulated by the government for
its own political ends. This matter is of great concern for Society...”(Bartholomew, Moore, Smith,
Allin (1995))[2]3
We think that these informational problems are potentially more serious at the interna-
tional level, for arrangements such as currency unions and federal redistribution schemes. In
this spirit Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) [5] argue that
”...in the European Union or in countries such as Russia and China (Laﬀont (1995)([15])...,
national or regional governments are the primary source of statistical information...while federal
authorities are at a disadvantage in assessing the quality of this information” [5].
With the exception of Bottazzi and Manasse (1998) [6] the issue of asymmetric infor-
mation in common currency areas has received no attention in the literature4. Dixit (2000,
p.779) [10], however, mentions this among the ”important extension(s) for future research”
in the field of monetary policy in currency unions. Conversely, there exist a large public
economics literature, particularly on fiscal federalism, that deals with problems of infor-
mation. Recent examples include Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) [5], who study
inter-regional redistribution when tax bases are imperfectly observable by the federal gov-
ernment; Cremer at Al. (1995)[9], Bucovetsky et al.(1996)[4], Levaggi (1991)[16] deal with
intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information over local preferences; Boadway et
al.[3] (1995), Raﬀ and Wilson (1995)[19]and Lockwood (1996)[18] study the issue of public
goods provision when technology is imperfectly observable. Finally, Laﬀont[15](1995) studies
fiscal arrangements in China.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the
benchmark case of full-information, when each country maintains its own currency. Section
3Another example is the elimination of the interest rate on mortgages from the definition of the CPI in
1993 in Britain. This was done in order to prevent inflation form shooting up whenever interest rates were
raised. Avinash Dixit jokingly tolds us about the ”Dixit and Goodhart” definition of ”core” inflation: the
index covering all goods whose price have not increased (!). Other interesting stories on statistics can be
read on the BBC site: http://www.stats.org/statswork/bbc-stats.htm
4With respect to our previous work, here we do not insist on microfoundations, and change the equilibrium
concept from dominant to bayesian strategies.
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4 discusses a Common Currency Area (CCA) with full information over economic conditions
in every member country. In Section 5 we extend the set-up to asymmetric information.
First we show that the full information policy is not incentive compatible, and we discuss
the potential costs of ignoring the problem of information. We then discuss two alternative
policy rules the solve the problem. The first policy ”separates” the types, while the second
”pools” them. Section 6 briefly discusses some possible extensions of the model, and Section
7 summarizes the main results.
2 The Model
There are two endowment-economies, each populated by an identical representative agent.
The agent’s indirect utility function, W, depends on inflation π, and on an output shock,
e, representing the deviation of output from trend. A negative realization means that the
economy is in ”recession”, a positive one that the economy is in ”expansion”. The output
shocks are independent across countries. We require the indirect utility function W (π, e) to
have some intuitive properties:
We(π, e) > 0,Wπ(0, e) > 0, Wππ(π, e) < 0,Wπe(π, e) < 0 (1)
where Wx(.) denotes the partial derivative of W with respect to x. The first property
captures the positive eﬀects of output on consumption. The second and the third represent
the idea that, at low level of inflation, π is beneficial; above a certain threshold, however,
the benefits peter out and the costs of inflation increase. Notice that, due to the last
inequality, a country’s most preferred rate of inflation falls when the state of the economy
improves. In the appendix we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of the money-
into-the utility-function type, where welfare in steady state exhibits such properties. For
this model, adapted from Bottazzi and Manasse(2002)([7]), seigniorage is an eﬃcient way
of financing the provision of a public good, when inflation is low. When inflation is high,
however, distortions in money demand and declining marginal utility of the public good set
in, and reduce welfare. Moreover, the preferred rate of inflation declines with output for the
following reason: high output yields high fiscal revenue and reduces the need of seigniorage
revenue. For expositional purposes we assume that the indirect utility function takes the
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quadratic form
W (π, e) = −1
2
π2 − eπ + f(e) , fe > 0 (2)
and assume that e can take a finite number of realizations in the interval [−s, s] , s > 0
with probabilities p(e),
P
e p(e) = 1, expected value E(e) = 0, and variance σ
2
e. The dis-
turbances across countries, e and e0(”the other’s” state), are independent. It will be very
convenient to consider the particular case where e can take only four possible realizations,
[−s,−s/2, s/2, s] , with equal probability p(e) = 1/4. Under the assumption5 of discrete
uniform distribution, the shocks have zero mean, and variance σ2e = (5/8)s
2.
3 Monetary Independence
Next we characterize the optimal policy when each country has monetary sovereignty. We
show that the optimal rule is counter-cyclical. After the realization of the shock, the national
central bank chooses inflation so as to
Max
π
W (π, e) (3)
The optimal inflation rule is simply given by
π(e) = −e (4)
The first-best rule is to run an expansionary policy in bad times and a contractionary policy
in good times. We can calculate the expected utility in this benchmark case, as well as the
first two moments of inflation6:
U(π(.)) =
X
e
p(e)W (π(e), e) =
σ2e
2
=
10
32
s2 = 0.312s2 (5)
E(π(e)) =
X
e
p(e)π(e) = 0, σ2π = σ
2
e =
20
32
s2 = 0.625s2
In the benchmark of monetary independence the average inflation rate is zero, and its
variability exactly matches that of the ”fundamentals”.
5We carry on with the more general notation p(e) since we discuss a more general case later on.
6We normalize the f(e) function so that
P
e p(e)f(e) = 0
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4 CCA under Full Information
Next we describe the optimal policy in a CCA when the two states e, e0 are fully observable.
We show that the standard ineﬃciency of the Optimal Currency Area literature arises for
the impossibility to tailor the common policy to individual needs. In a Common Currency
Area, monetary policy is set by common central bank, the CCB, which chooses a common
inflation rate, after observing the realizations of the shocks in the two countries. Thus the
CCB solves
Max
π
(W (π, e) +W (π, e0)) (6)
The optimal policy rule is
πE(e, e0) = −e+ e
0
2
(7)
What matters now is the aggregate (mean) state of the economy. This rule has some intuitive
properties: i) it treats both types equally (it is ”fair”), πE(e, e0) = πE(e0, e) ; ii) it is
symmetric, π(e, e0) = −π(−e,−e0); iii) it is non-increasing in the shocks, πEe (e, e0) ≤ 0 , so
that inflation is not raised when more favorable shock are reported, and iv) it coincides with
the first-best rule when shocks are identical, πE(e, e) = π(e).The last two properties show
the nature of the conflict of interest between countries, when shocks diﬀer: the country
experiencing a recession (”boom”) favors a looser (tighter) monetary policy than the one
implemented by the CCB: π(e0) > πE(e, e0) > π(e) for e > e0. Thus the rule gives rise
to the standard ineﬃciency of currency unions, the one-policy-fits-all, whenever shocks are
asymmetric. We can compare the two regimes by computing welfare:
U(πE(.)) =
X
e
X
e0
p(e)p(e0)W (πE(e, e0), e) =
5
32
s2 = 0.156 s2
E(πE(.)) =
X
e
X
e0
p(e)p(e0)πE(e, e0) = 0 , σ2πE = σ
2
e/2 =
10
32
s2 = 0.312s2 (8)
With respect to the regime of Monetary Independence, the CCA reduces welfare by 50%7
(U(πE)/U(π) = 1/2). The loss doesn’t not stem from the average level of inflation, which
7This number must be treated with caution, since it relies on our normalization
P
p(e)f(e) = 0. Had we
normalized this expression to another constant , we would have obtained a diﬀerent number.
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is the same in the two regimes, but from its inertia ( i.e. sub-optimal inflation variability):
since shocks are independent, the policy rule cannot match the variability of the state of each
individual economy. This is the standard loss of an independent policy tool for stabilization.
5 Asymmetric Information
Suppose now that both governments have an informational advantage regarding the state of
their own economy: the domestic government observes e but not e0, and viceversa the foreign
one. The CCB cannot verify either one. In such circumstances, the policy rule of the CCB
must be contingent on the states reported by the two governments, e,e0. Each government
may try to exploit its informational advantage in order to induce the CCB to choose a policy
that better fits the state of its own economy. If the CCB ignores this incentive, it ends up
choosing the ”right” policy for the ”wrong” state. Therefore, she must design a policy rule
such that truthful revelation occurs. Next we show that, in order to ”separate” the types
and extract the correct information, the rule must over-react to large symmetric shocks and
under-react to small asymmetric ones.
5.1 The game
Let’s be more precise about the game being played. The timing is the following. In stage
1 the CCB designs a policy rule π(e,e0) that depends on the reports. In stage 2 the shocks
are realized, but only national governments observe national realizations. In stage 3, given
the policy rule, countries simultaneously choose a report in order to maximize their own
expected utility, where the expectation is taken over the other country’s report. Finally, the
CCB implements the rule according to the reported states.
The optimal reporting strategy of ”type” e, R(e,π(e, e0)) consists in choosing the state to
report so as to maximize his own expected utility, taking the expectations over the other
country’s report:
R(e,π(e,e0)) = argmaxe Ee0W (π(e,e0), e) (9)
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An equilibrium with truthful revelation is defined as a set of reports e,e0 and policy rule
π(e,e0), such that i) given the policy rule, each country chooses an optimal report, R(.); ii)
reports are truthful, R(e,π(e,e0) = e; and iii) the policy rule is optimal, in the sense that it
maximizes expected welfare:
π(e, e0) = argmax
π
U(π(e,e0)) (10)
The policy can be viewed as a contract that the two parties (the governments) sign before
the realization of the shocks. The contract describes the rate of inflation that the CCB must
implement in all possible contingencies.
5.1.1 Incentives to lie
Here we show that the second-best rule πE(.) (7) does not induce truth-telling, i.e. it is not
incentive-compatible. Intuitively, given this rule, each country is tempted to overemphasize
its shock, so as to pull the rate of inflation closer to its most preferred rate π(e). But then,
if the governments systematically lie to the CCB, and CCB insists on applying πE, the
consequences are ”disastrous”. The CCB can do better, but at the cost of introducing some
distortions in her policy rule.
To see this, first we need to calculate the optimal report when the rule πE(.) is implemented
With the aid of equation (7), write the country’s indirect utility (2) as follows:
W (πE(e, e0), e) = −1
2
µ
−e+ e0
2
¶2
− e
µ
−e+ e0
2
¶
+ f(e) (11)
Having observed the realization of his own state, type e chooses his report by forming an
expectation on e0. Expected utility of type e is therefore
Ee0W (πE(e,e0), e) = −1
8
¡e2 +Ee0(e20) + 2eEe0(e0)¢+ ee
2
+
eEe0(e0)
2
+ f(e) (12)
The optimal report R is found by choosing the value of e that maximizes the above expres-
sion8. The first order condition for this problem is:
R = 2e−Ee0(e0) = 2e− E(R0) (13)
8To deliver the intuition we look at the limit case when e is a continuous variable.
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where to save on notation, we writeE(R0) = Ee0(e0), and, for the other’s expectation, E0(R) =
Ee(e). From this expression it is easy to see that the policy rule πE does not induce truth-
telling under rational expectations. The proof runs as follows. Each type would report the
true state, R = e only provided E(R0) = e holds. Since, by symmetry, the other player’s op-
timal report satisfies R0 = 2e0−E0(R), it follows that R = 2e−E(2e0−E0(R)) = 2e−2E(e0)+
R, by the law of iterated expectations (E(E0(x)) = E(x)). Thus E(e0) = E(R0) = e must
hold for truth-telling to be the optimal strategy: in order to report the true state each type
must expect the other ’s shock to be perfectly correlated with his own. But this expectation
is not rational, given that the shocks are known to be independent.Q.E.D.
The same argument establishes that E(R0) = E(e0) = 0, i.e. the optimal report has the
same expected value of the true shock. But then, types ±s/2 will lie and, following (13) they
will report, ±s, respectively: when the policy πE is followed, only ”extreme” shocks will be
declared. Note that those who experience the extreme states for real are constrained to report
the truth, since e = ±2s simply does not exist. Moreover, types±s have no scope for lying: if
they report an intermediate state, they end up pushing the CCB in the ”wrong” direction”.9
Finally, observe that since only states s and −s will be reported, with equal probability,
the expectation E(R0) = E(e0) = 0 is indeed rational under the rule πE. The intuition
is straightforward. Type −s/2 expects the other to report zero on average, so he knows
that if he declares the truth and the CCB follows the rule πE(e, e0), he will get, on average,
πE = s/4. But this policy is ”too tight” for him (he prefers π(−s/2) = s/2 > s/4). In order
to induce the CCB to choose a looser policy, he declares that the economy is experiencing
a very deep recession (and report −s instead). By so doing (if the CCB believes him) he
expects to get away with his first best, πE(−s, 0) = π(−s/2) = s/2. The same argument
holds for type s/2,who will always overemphasize the positive state and report a ”boom”
s, in order to get a tigher policy.10
9For example, type −s likes a very expansionary policy π(−s) = s, and, if he say the truth, he expects
to get a rate of inflation πE = s/2 which is lower than desired. However, if he lies and reports, for example,
−s/2, he only harm himself, as he manages to induce an even less expansionary policy, πE = s/4.
10This argument exploits the fact that EπE(.) = πE(E(.)) due to the linearity of πE(.).
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5.1.2 The Dangers of ”Closing the Eyes”
The implication of this is striking: should the CCB ”close her eyes” and adhere to the
full information rule when governments cheat, she would end up alternating between ex-
tremely loose and extremely strict policies. She would alternate between πE(s, s) = −s,
πE(−s,−s) = s, and πE(s,−s) = 0, the wrong policies most of the time. With governments
cheating, excess volatility would result, and expected welfare UC(πE) would only be
UC(πE(.)) =
4
32
s2 < U(πE(.)) =
5
32
s2
EC(πE(.)) = 0, σ2
πEC
=
16
32
s2 >
10
32
s2 = σ2πE (14)
which corresponds to a 20% loss (1−UC/UE = 0.2) with respect to the full information
outcome. Clearly, this stems from an excess inflation variability, which exceeds by 60% the
full information benchmark (16/10− 1 = 0. 6)
5.2 The ”Separating” Inflation Rule
The CCB can do better by designing a policy rule that is incentive compatible. We apply
the revelation principle to our game, so that if an equilibrium of the game exists, it must
also be a solution to the following problem: the CCB chooses a policy rule that maximizes
expected welfare subject to the incentive compatibility constraints. We impose the reasonable
restriction that the rule must satisfy the properties of ”fairness”, ”symmetry” and that of
being ”non increasing in the shocks”, i)-iii), discussed in Section 4. Hence we need only
to consider the incentive compatibility constraint of types s/2 (and −s/2). Formally, the
optimal rule solves Problem 1:
max
π(e,e0)
U(π(e, e0)) =
X
e
X
e0
p(e)p(e0)W (π(e, e0), e) (15)
s.t (16)X
e0
p(e0)W (π(s/2, e0), s/2) ≥
X
e0
p(e0)W (π(s, e0), s/2) (17)X
e0
p(e0)W (π(− s/2, e0),−s/2) ≥
X
e0
p(e0)W (π(−s, e0),−s/2) (18)
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The incentive compatibility constraint (17) states that, under the rule, type s/2 is at least as
well oﬀ, in expected terms, by reporting s/2 rather than s. A similar interpretation applies
to equation (18) for type −s/2.
The solution of this problem is simplified by noting that, because of the symmetry of the
optimal rule, π(e, e0) = −π(−e,−e0), either both constraints bind, or neither does. In the
Appendix we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let πS(e, e0) denote the inflation rule that solves Problem 1. When states
of nature are equally likely, p(e) = 1/4, all e, this policy satisfies the following proper-
ties: i) it over-reacts to large symmetric shocks, πS(−s,−s) > πE(−s,−s) = s, πS(s, s) <
πE(s, s) = −s; ii) it under-reacts to small asymmetric shocks, πS(s/2,−s) < πE(s/2,−s) =
s/4, πS(−s/2, s) > πE(−s/2, s) = −s/4 ; iii) the rule coincides with πE(.) in the remaining
cases ±(s/2, s), ±(s/2, s/2), (s/2,−s/2)
INSERT HERE FIGURE 1
The proposition has an intuitive interpretation. The rule must make the intermediate
types indiﬀerent, in expected terms, between reporting the truth and lying. It does so in
two ways (see Figure 1). First, in order to discourage extreme (false) reports, it makes
inflation so high in symmetric bad states (−s,−s), and so low in good ones (s, s) that only
countries who really experience these shocks may want to say so. This explains point i). At
the same time, the policy encourages truthtelling by giving rents to the intermediate types
in asymmetric states, e.g. (s/2,−s). Here the rule distorts the rate of inflation towards the
center, i.e. towards the level preferred by the intermediate types. Notice that the alternative
of punishing who reports −s by further raising inflation would not work here, since then type
s/2 would have an even greater incentive to lie (and report s).This explains point ii). Finally,
the policy does not need to distort the symmetric outcomes such as ±(s/2, s),±(s/2, s/2) cf
point iii), since the rule aims precisely at making types ±s/2 indiﬀerent between telling the
truth and reporting ±s.
How eﬀective is this rule for limiting the excess burden of asymmetric information?This
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can be discovered by calculating11
U(πS(e, e0)) =
4. 961
32
s2 = 0.155 s2 < U(πE(.)) =
5
32
s2
E(πS(.)) = 0 , σ2πS =
9. 921
32
= 0.310s2 <
10
32
s2 = σ2πE (19)
Under the rule, welfare under asymmetric information falls below full information (but
just .06% (= 1 − US/UE)).This happens because the rule exacerbates the ”inertia” (sub-
optimal inflation variability) of the CCA.
5.3 The ”Pooling” Inflation Rule(s)
There is an alternative way for CCB to eliminate the incentive to lie. It suﬃces to choose a
rate of inflation that ”pools” types ±s and ±s/2. The idea here is that the CCB only uses
the information on the ”sign” of the reported shocks, positive or negative, and completely
disregards the information concerning the ”size”of the shock. We show that this rule improves
upon the cheating outcome, although it also leads to excessive inertia.
The optimal ”pooling” rule solves Problem 2 :
max
π(e,e0)
U(π(e, e0)) =
X
e
X
e0
p(e)p(e0)W (π(e, e0), e)
s.t (20)
π(s/2, s) = π(s, s) = π(s/2, s/2) = πP+ (21)
π(s/2,−s) = π(s,−s) = π(s,−s/2) = π(s/2,−s/2) = πP+− (22)
together with similar constraint for type −s/212
The rule makes type s/2 indiﬀerent between reporting the true state or state s simply by
choosing the same level of inflation irrespective of the two reports. It is immediate to show
the following:
11We assume that indiﬀerence is enough to induce truth telling in the calculation below.
12Alternatively, we can simply impose the symmetry and ”fairness” requirements that π(e, e0) =
−π(−e,−e0), and π(e, e0) = π(e0, e).
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Proposition 2 Let πP (e,e0) denote the inflation rule that solves Problem 2. Under a dis-
crete uniform distribution of shocks, p(e) = 1/4 all e, this policy satisfies the following
properties: πP+ = π
E(s/2, s) = −(3/4)s; πP+− = 0
The reason for this result is quite simple: the three possible outcomes in the two con-
straints are equally likely, so that the CCB chooses the inflation rate that is optimal in the
intermediates states , (s/2, s), (−s/2, s/2). A diﬀerent policy would strongly penalize inter-
mediate types and further reduce welfare. It is possible to evaluate the implications of this
rule by computing the expected utility U(πP (e, e0))
U(πP (e, e0)) =
4.5
32
s2 = 0.141 s2 < U(πE(.)) =
5
32
s2
E(πP (.)) = 0 , σ2πP =
9
32
s2 = 0.281s2 <
10
32
s2 = σ2πE (23)
The pooling rule is clearly preferable to the cheating outcome, (confront (23) and (14)).
However, it is worse than the separating rule (confront (23) and (19)).since it aggravates the
problem of inertia ( i.e. sub-optimal inflation variability).
This is by no means the only pooling rule that eliminates the incentives to lie. One
simple possibility for the CCB would be to ignore the informative content of each message
and choose π(e, e0) = π for all e, e0. The ”optimal” inflation rate for this case would be πP1 =
πE(E(e), E(e0)) = 0, and lead to UP1 = σ2
πP1
= 0. By imposing unnecessary constraints, this
policy rule is clearly inferior to the πP rule.13
6 Extensions
Next discuss some relevant extensions of the model. First we consider the case where small
and large shocks occur with diﬀerent probabilities. Second, we briefly discuss the case of
many countries.
13Another pooling rule compatible with equilibrium is one that does not discriminate among small shocks
of either sign, π(−s/2,−s/2) = π(−s/2, s/2) = π(s/2, s/2).
Contrary to the πP , however, such rule would not by itself eliminate the incentive to lie, so that incentive
compatibility constraints similar to (17) should also be required. For this reason such rule will never be
preferable to the separating rule.
13
6.1 Distribution of Shocks
Suppose that ”large” and ”small” shocks occur with diﬀerent probabilities. How does this
aﬀect the results? Two important things happen. First when the probability associated to
either small or large shocks tends to zero, the full information solution applies: the CCB can
safely ignore the reports concerning states that occur with zero probability.
Second, when large shocks becomes suﬃciently likely, the welfare gain from adopting the
separating rather than the pooling rule becomes smaller. Assume
p(s) = p(−s) = p/2 (24)
p(s/2) = p(−s/2) = (1− p)/2
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. For example, if large shock are relatively rare events, p < 1/2.
6.1.1 Back to Full Information
Consider the ”extreme” cases when p− > 0 or p− > 1 : clearly the problem of asymmetry
of information disappears. It is easy to show that when large shocks almost ”never” occur,
p− > 0, the CCB can safely disregard ”large reports” and optimally chooses πS(s, s/2) =
πE(s/2, s/2), πS(−s, s/2) = πE(−s/2, s/2)14. Similarly, if p− > 1, so that small shocks
”never” occur, the CCB can safely disregard ”small reports” and optimally chooses πS(s, s/2) =
πE(s, s).
6.1.2 Separating vs Pooling Rules
We are interested in comparing the welfare levels of the two policy rules, for diﬀerent values
of p. It is easy to show that the optimal ”pooling” rule for the general case of distribution
(24) is given by
πP+ = −
s(1 + p)
2
, πP+− = 0 (25)
14In the (zero-probability) event of two large reports, for example (s, s), any inflation rate (and among
them πE(s)) will do
14
Clearly, the higher the probability of large shocks the higher (in absolute value) inflation
under pooling. When p = 1/2, the solution is πP+ = −(3/4)s, as before (cf. Proposition 2).
It is very diﬃcult to find a closed form solution for πS for the case p ∈ (0, 1).However, we
can resort to numerical solution (see Table 1 below)15:
U / p 0 1/8 1/4 1/2 3/4 7/8 1
U(πS) 0.062s2 0.085s2 0.108 s2 0.15502 s2 0.2022 s2 0.226 s2 0.25s2
U(πP ) 0.062s2 0.079s2 0.098 s2 0.141 s2 0.192 s2 0.219s2 0.25s2
U(πS)/U(πP )− 1 0 7.6% 10.8% 10.2% 5% 3.2% 0
Table 1: Numerical solution
In the extreme cases of only small (p = 0) or large (p = 1) shocks, the two policies are
equivalent (we are eﬀectively in the case of full information). If large and small shocks are
equally likely, p = 1/2, (p(e) = 1/4, all e) we are back to our discrete uniform distribution,
with the πS rule outperforming the πP rule. Interestingly, the table shows that the relative
gain from adopting the separating rather than the pooling rule first rises and then falls
with the probability of large shock, p. The reason is as follows. The two rules give the full
information outcome at the extremes , p = 0, 1: however, welfare is increasing and concave
in p under separation, while it is increasing and convex under pooling, so that their ratio
initially rises and then falls with p.
6.2 Many Countries
Having many countries in the Currency Area aggravates the distorsions of asymmetric in-
formation. Clearly, the standard ineﬃciency one-policy-fits all increases with the number of
members, and so does the incentives to misreport information: hence larger distortions in the
policy rule are required to prevent mimicking. Consider the separating rule first. In order
15In theAppendix we show that part i) of Proposition 1 goes through in non uniform case p(e), i.e.the
rule must over-react to large asymmetric shock. Similarly, the result that symmetric reports (e,−e) are not
distorted still applies. Finally, a suﬃcient condition for the rule to under-react to small asymmetric shocks
(cf part ii of the proposition), is that the probability of large shocks p ≥ 1/2. For the remaining cases (cf
part iii of Proposition 1) the optimal policy distorts inflation towards the extremes or the middle depending
on whether p > or < 1/2 , respectively.
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to sketch the argument, let the CCA be formed by j = 1, 2, ...N ≥ 2 identical countries, ex-
periencing independent, discrete-uniformly distributed shocks ej. The full information rule
now is
πE(e) ≡ πE(e1,...eN) = −
1
N
NX
j=1
ej (26)
so that inflation has mean zero, and its variability σ2π = σ
2
e/N tends to zero as N goes to
infinity. This implies, from the Central Limit Theorem, that the CCB will ”always” choose
an inflation rate equal to zero. It is easy to see that the incentive to overemphasize the shock
rises with N. Proceeding as in Section 5.216, the optimal report of country i is now
Ri = Nei −E
ÃX
j 6=i
Rj
!
(27)
Compare (27) with (13): the larger the number of member countries, the larger the incentive
to over-emphasize the shock. As N grows suﬃciently large, it must become increasingly
costly to separate the types.
In the case of pooling, the three constraints in (21) must be replaced by (N−1)+2 = N+1
constraints:
π(s/2, s1) = π(s/2, s/2, s2) = ...π(s/21, s) = π(s) = π(s/2) = π
P
+ (28)
where e is a realization of N states equal to e, and en is a realization where all but
n states (i.e. N − n) are equal to e. In summary, the distortions of both policy rules (of all
rules) are likely to be fostered by the number of CCA members17.
16Under asymmetric information, the indirect utility of country i under the rule (26) is
W (πE, ei) = −
1
2N2
(e2i + (X
j 6=i
ej)2 + 2eiX
j 6=i
ej)
+
eiei
N
+
ei
P
j 6=i ej
N
Taking the expectation and solving for the optimal report, as in Sect.5.2, yields the expression in the text.
17Since a closed form solution for the separating rule becomes intractable, we were unable to compare the
two rules for diﬀerent values of N.
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7 Discussion
When members of a currency union experience idiosyncratic shocks, a conflict of interest over
the stance of monetary policy arises. If governments have an informational advantage over
the state of their domestic economy, this lead to a problem of adverse selection. National
authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their
needs. Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the monetary authority ends
up inappropriately implementing ”stop and go” policies that add to inflation variability
and are detrimental to welfare. The paper shows that monetary policy must over-react
to large symmetric shocks and under-react to small asymmetric ones. In order to provide
the incentives for truthful revelation, monetary policy become unduly expansive in bad
states and unduly restrictive in good ones, while it reacts too little to economic conditions
in intermediate states. Overall, this aggravates the problem of sub-optimal volatility of
inflation of CCA and causes a welfare loss. Alternatively, the Central Bank may decide to
disregard some of the information reported by national authorities. In particular, when the
Central Bank conditions her policy only to the ”sign” of the reports (expansion/recession),
the resulting policy rule is even more plagued by inertia: monetary policy under-reacts to
the area economic conditions, and inflation variability is sub-optimal.
How robust are these conclusions? The model is clearly very stylized, yet we think that
the conclusions are quite general: for example, the model can be given microfoundations
(see the appendix). An interesting question for future research is whether intertemporal
considerations may help reducing the distortions required for incentive compatibility. Along
the lines of Atkenson and Lucas ([1]), one may conjecture that the CCB may induce truth-
telling by conditioning her policy not only on current reports, but also on past ones, so that,
for example, high inflation in a bad state today may come at the expenses of a lower inflation
in a bad state tomorrow. The resulting dynamics of inflation over time are a topic worth
investigating.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Microfoundations
Here we provide a theoretical underpinning for the choice of our welfare function. Consider the
following model. The world consists of two countries. Each country (domestic and foreign) is
populated by a representative infinitely lived agent. We abstract from labor mobility. Both
economies are endowed with one homogeneous good, et, which is defined in terms of random
(i.i.d.). deviations from the trend e = 0 Each period, consumers face a given sequence of prices,
tax rates and public spending, {pt, gt, τ t} , observe the realization of their endowment, and decide
how much to consume, ct, and save out of their disposable income. The endowment is taxed at a
proportional rate, τ t. Households save by carrying nominal money balances,Mt+1 into next period.
There is neither capital nor bonds in the economy. Preferences are described by an additively sep-
arable utility function, where separability is assumed both with respect to time and with respect
to the arguments. Consumers choose the sequence {ct,Mt+1}∞0 so as to maximize the present
discounted value of their utility stream18:
U =
∞X
t=0
βtU(ct, Mt+1
pt
, gt) =
∞X
t=0
βt
µ
u(ct) + V (
Mt+1
pt
) +H(gt)
¶
(29)
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the rate of time preference, Mt+1
pt
is the stock of domestic money bal-
ances at the beginning of period t + 1, expressed in units of time t goods, V and H are quasi-
concave functions. Great simplification is obtained by assuming that utility is linear in consumption,
u(ct) = ct (cf. Calvo and Guidotti (1993)[8]). The consumer’s budget constraint under Monetary
Independence (MI) is
ct +
Mt+1
pt
= (1− τ t)et +
Mt
pt
(30)
Similarly, in a CCA, the constraint reads
ct + σ
fMt+1
pt
= (1− τ t)et + σ
fMt
pt
(31)
18Since we need to justify why individuals hold real money balances, we need a model of intertem-
poral choice. An alternative approach would be to assume that money economizes on transaction
costs. In this case real balances enter the budget constraint rather than the utility function. Under
certain regularity conditions the two approaches are equivalent. See Feenstra (1986).
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where fMt =Mt+M∗t represents the common currency, which is held by both domestic and foreign
households19, and σ = 1−σ∗ represent the share of the common currency that is held by domestic
consumers. For simplicity we assume that et,is a zero mean i.i.d. disturbance. Depending on the
exchange rate regime, the national Central Bank (or the CCB) chooses the sequence of nominal
balances, {Mt}∞1 (or
nfMto∞
1
)given an initial value M0 (fM0).
8.1.1 Government budget constraint
National governments raise revenue by taxing the endowment at proportional rate τ t and by
seigniorage. For the sake of simplicity we do not consider the choice of τ t which is assumed
mandatory fixed and constant over time. Again, the budget constraint diﬀers between monetary
regimes. Under MI we have
gt = τet +
Mt+1 −Mt
pt
In turn, in a CCA, the constraint reads:
gt = τet + σ
ÃfMt+1 − fMt
pt
!
(32)
By substituting the government constraint into the consumer constraint for MI and CCA respec-
tively, one finds the resource constraint ct + gt = et
8.1.2 Solution
Solving the private sector maximization problem for the case of MI (29) subject to the constraint
(30), and re-arranging the first order conditions for ct and Mt+1, recalling linearity, yields
1 = V 0(
Mt+1
pt
) + β
pt
pt+1
(33)
This is a standard arbitrage condition that assures that no gains can be made by re-allocating
consumption over time. Finally, we place the following restriction on the choice of the optimal
19Here we are assuming that the sequence of prices in the two countries is the same when they
share the same currency.
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monetary policy. We assume that the Central Bank chooses the rate of money growth in order
to achieve a rate of inflation that is a time-invariant function of the disturbance(s), so that eπt
= pt+1−pt
pt
= eπ(et) . It is easy to see that this restriction implies that the rate of money growth,
µt =
Mt+1−Mt
Mt
is also a time-invariant function of the disturbance(s) and equals eπ(.)20. Thus we
can write the demand for money and consumption in MI as follows:
Mt+1
pt
= m(π(et)), all t, Mπ < 0 (34)
ct = (1− τ)et − π(et)m(π(et)) (35)
where it is convenient to define π(.) = pt+1− pt
pt+1
= eπ(.)
1+eπ(.)21. The same conditions apply in a
CCA, with σfM replacing M, and assuming that policy rule is a time-invariant function of both
disturbances, e, e∗.These expressions immediately yield the indirect utility function W in MI
(1− β)W (π(.), e) = (1− τ)e− π(.)m(π(.)) + V (m(π(.)) + H [τe+ π(.)m(π(.))] (36)
and similarly for the CCA. The welfare function shows the nature of the optimal seigniorage problem
of this economy. The inflation tax finances the provision of public goods, which are valued by
consumers. Inflation, however, reduces real money holdings and induces distortions in the demand
for money. It is immediate to show that this welfare function, under intuitive conditions, satisfies
the assumptions in equation (1)
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Setting p(e) = 1/4 in Problem 1 (15) gives the following first order conditions:
20From the first-order condition for real balances one can see that a constant rate of inflation
implies constant money demand Mt+1pt . But since
Mt+1
pt
≡ Mt+1pt+1
pt+1
pt
, constant inflation and money
demand require that Mt+1pt+1 is also constant. Thus in equilibrium the rate of money growth must
equal the inflation rate.
21With a slight abuse of terminology, from now on we will call π, rather than eπ, the inflation
rate. Also, given the stationarity of the policy rule, although not of the inflation rate, we suppress
the time notation when it is not necessary.
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π−s,−s : Wπ(−s,π) = λWπ(−s/2,π) (37)
π−s.,−s/2 : [Wπ(−s,π) +Wπ(−s/2,π)] = −λ [Wπ(−s/2,π)−Wπ(−s/2,π)] (38)
π−s,s : [Wπ(−s,π) +Wπ(s,π)] = λ [Wπ(s/2,π) +Wπ(−s/2,π)] (39)
π−s/2,−s/2 : Wπ(−s/2,π)(1 + λ) = 0 (40)
π−s/2,s/2 : [Wπ(−s/2,π) +Wπ(s/2,π)] (1 + λ) = 0 (41)
π−s/2,s : [Wπ(−s/2,π) +Wπ(s,π)] = λ [Wπ(s/2,π)−Wπ(−s/2,π)] (42)
where we have exploited the fact that the multipliers of the two incentive compatibility con-
straints are equal by symmetry:λ+ = λ− = λ
Since the r.h.s. of (38) is zero, π(−s,−s/2) is not distorted and coincides with πE(−s,−s/2). Also,
from (41) we see that π(−s/2, s/2) = 0 = πE(−s/2, s/2). But then the r.h.s. of (39) is also zero,
implying π(−s, s) = 0 = πE(−s, s).Thus we are left with equations (37) and (42). These, and
the incentive constraint (18) can be written for our quadratic specification as follows:
(π(−s,−s)− s)− λ(π(−s,−s)− s/2) = 0
4π(−s/2, s) + s− 2λs = 0
s2/8 + sπ(−s/2, s) + π(−s,−s)
2
2
− (s/2)π(−s,−s) = 0
The solution gives πS(−s,−s) = 1.09s > s, πS(−s/2, s) = −0.174s > −s/4;λS = 0.152.
8.3 Distribution of Shocks
Proposition 1 is modified as follows
Proposition 2 Let πS(e,e0) denote the inflation rule that solves Problem 1.When the dis-
tribution of states of nature is given by (24) and 0 < p < 1, this policy satisfies the following
properties: i) πS(.) over-reacts to large symmetric shocks (in the sense of Proposition 1) ; ii) a suf-
ficient (but not necessary) condition for πS(e,e0) to under-react to small asymmetric shocks (as in
Proposition 1) is p ≥ 1/2; iii) the rule coincides with πE(.) in the cases ±(s/2, s/2), (s/2,−s/2);
iv) for the cases ±(s, s/2) there are multiple solutions. When p < 1/2, the policy associated to
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a global maximum distorts inflation towards the extremes (πS(−s,−s/2) > πE(−s,−s/2) =
3/4s, πS(s, s/2) < πE(s, s/2) = −3/4s); when p > 1/2 the distortion is towards the
center : πS(−s,−s/2) < πE(−s,−s/2), πS(s, s/2) > πE(s, s/2);finally when p = 1/2, the
policy rule πS is not distorted, as in Proposition 1
Proof. When the distribution is given by (24), the first-order conditions become:
π−s,−s : pWπ(−s,π) = λWπ(−s/2,π) (43)
π−s.,−s/2 :
p(1− p)
2
[Wπ(−s,π) +Wπ(−s/2,π)] = λ
(1− 2p)
2
[Wπ(−s/2,π)] (44)
π−s,s : p [Wπ(−s,π) +Wπ(s,π)] = λ [Wπ(s/2,π) +Wπ(−s/2,π)] (45)
π−s/2,−s/2 :
µ
1− p
2
¶2
Wπ(−s/2,π)
µ
2 +
µ
1− p
2
¶
λ
¶
= 0 (46)
π−s/2,s/2 : [Wπ(−s/2,π) +Wπ(s/2,π)]
µ
1− p
2
¶
(1− p+ λ) = 0 (47)
π−s/2,s :
(1− p)p
2
[Wπ(−s/2,π) +Wπ(s,π)] = (48)
λ
·µ
1− p
2
¶
Wπ(s/2,π)−
³p
2
´
Wπ(−s/2,π)
¸
Comparing (43) with (37) we can see that the condition for π(−s,−s) is unaﬀected by the
change in the distribution. A similar condition holds for π(s, s), so that part i) of Proposition 2
holds.
Comparing (44) with (38) we can see that when p = 1/2, π(−s,−s/2) is not distorted, while
if p > 1/2 ,the r.h.s. of (44) is positive , since Wπ(−s/2,π) < 0,so that π(−s,−s/2) is below
the full information value, see part iv) of Proposition 2
Finally, comparing (47) with (41) we see that π(−s/2, s/2) is the same as in full information. This
and equation (46) implies that also π(−s, s) from (45) is the same as under full information, cf
point iii)
The case for small asymmetric shocks, (−s/2, s) is slightly more complex, since there are multiple
solutions. Computing these solutions numerically and taking the one that delivers global maximum
gives a value of π(−s/2, s) < s/2 (which is reasonable since the π(−s/2) = s/2) When this
inequality is satisfied, we see that the r.h.s. of (48)
¡
2p−1
2
¢
π− s
4
is surely negative for p ≥ 1/2. Thus
, under this condition, the l.h.s. of (48) is also negative , implying that πA(−s/2, s) > πE(−s/2, s),
cf part ii) of Proposition 2
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